

SEMIANNUAL REPORT

TO THE UNITED STATES CONGRESS

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OFFICE of INSPECTOR GENERAL
NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION



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We appreciate that Congress has recognized the important role of the accountability community at this critical time. As historic levels of federal relief quickly flow to Americans, state and local governments, hospitals, and businesses such as Amtrak, the risk of fraud, waste, and abuse will undoubtedly increase. We and our oversight partners remain committed to providing the necessary attention that will help ensure those vast resources are used appropriately.



Kevin H. Winters | *Inspector General*

FROM THE INSPECTOR GENERAL

I am pleased to submit the Amtrak Office of Inspector General *Semiannual Report to the United States Congress* for the six months ending March 31, 2020. We are submitting this report at a time when Amtrak is facing unprecedented challenges as a result of the coronavirus pandemic. Ridership has dropped to historic lows, revenue losses are mounting, and service across the country has been reduced or canceled while the country adjusts to this national emergency. As the nation's passenger railroad, however, Amtrak continues to operate its trains and designated its core personnel as "essential."

We are keenly aware of the challenges the company faces, and we remain dedicated to balancing our mission requirements with those of Amtrak as it works through the issues and uncertainties associated with the pandemic.

We appreciate that Congress has recognized the important role of the accountability community at this critical time. As historic levels of federal relief quickly flow to Americans, state and local governments, hospitals, and businesses such as Amtrak, the risk of fraud, waste, and abuse will undoubtedly increase. We and our oversight partners remain committed to providing the necessary attention that will help ensure those vast resources are used appropriately.

In the past six months, our auditors completed multiple high-impact reports, to include a congressionally mandated report assessing the effects of poor on-time performance (OTP) on the company's operating costs and revenues. We found that even small improvements to OTP would result in financial benefits, while long-term and sustained improvements could help the company realize cost savings and revenue improvements in the tens of millions of dollars. Regarding the company's safety and security, we

audited Amtrak Express—its shipping program—and found numerous instances of operational and security-related weaknesses. We also continued to identify faults within the company's medical claims process, where we found 191 non-hospital facilities with billing patterns indicative of fraud, putting \$57 million the company paid to them at risk.

Investigative work during the period also bore significant results. In one case, our work led to a two-and-a-half-year prison sentence and \$2.68 million in restitution for a Los Angeles based acupuncturist who bilked the company's health care plan for treatments and services that were never provided. Our investigators continued to work several ticket-fraud schemes in which individuals steal identities and credit cards via the dark web, buy Amtrak tickets and exchange them for vouchers, and then sell them online. These investigations have led to indictments and guilty pleas as our team continues to identify and pursue this insidious form of criminal activity.

Going forward, we are making the necessary adjustments to the challenging environment in which we all work and live, and I am very proud of the resolute determination of our staff to provide independent and objective oversight of Amtrak's operations and programs. Together, we will continue to safely focus on issues critical to Amtrak, its stewardship of public funds, and overall accountability. We trust that you will find this report informative.



OFFICE OF AUDITS

Safety and Security

Addressing Security Weaknesses and Operational Impacts of Amtrak Express is Critical to the Program's Future

(Report No. OIG-A-2020-005, January 22, 2020)

The company operates a package shipping program, Amtrak Express, as an initiative to generate additional revenue. Through this program, individuals pay to ship packages on the company's trains between more than 100 locations. The company estimated that, in fiscal year (FY) 2019, the program's costs exceeded its \$2.5 million in revenues by \$198,000. The company's analysis also showed that the program was causing train delays throughout its network. As a result, company leadership began discussions about the future direction of the program.

Our prior work helped identify security vulnerabilities with the program, including a drug-trafficking organization using it to ship hundreds of packages of illegal drugs on trains from 2010 to 2016. Given these developments, our objective was to evaluate the effectiveness of the program's security controls and operations.

We found that security weaknesses in Amtrak Express continued to place employees, passengers, and the company's brand at risk, and that operational inefficiencies continued to contribute to train delays and have other impacts. For example, we identified operational inefficiencies in the program that contributed to 109 delays of 5 minutes or longer from April through September 2019. These delays resulted in part because the program relies on a manual, paper-based process instead of an electronic package management system—a tool common across the shipping industry. The company estimated that such a system could cost about \$16 million for both passenger baggage and Amtrak Express.

Resolving security weaknesses and operational inefficiencies to reduce the risks they pose is imperative to any future operational scenario for the program. We recommended two actions that are critical to any future



scenario of the program: implementing security controls, including employee training, and improving the program's paper-based, manual process, including investing in electronic tools to reduce operational inefficiencies. The company agreed with our recommendations.

Ongoing Work

Audit of the Company's Police and Security

Operations. Our objective is to evaluate the company's mission and processes for providing police and security services to passengers, employees, and company assets compared to other successful organizations.

Audit of the Company's Monitoring of Prescription Opioid Misuse in its Workforce.

Our objective is to assess company efforts to monitor the use of prescription opioids by employees in safety-sensitive positions and mitigate the potential safety risks they pose.

Train Operations

Acela 21 Program Continues to Face Significant Risk of Delays, Warranting More Contingency Planning *(Report No. OIG-A-2020-004, January 21, 2020)*

The Acela is the company's most profitable business line, and the company relies on Acela revenue to meet its financial goals. The \$2.1 billion Acela 21 program is the largest single investment in the company's 49-year history. Through this program, the company plans to buy 28 new trainsets to replace the 20 trainsets that have provided high-speed service on the Northeast Corridor—the nation's busiest passenger rail corridor—since 2000.

The Acela 21 program is entering a critical stage if it is to begin revenue service on time. The company has experienced problems with other recent, major acquisitions, and our prior work in 2017 identified risks to completing the Acela 21 program on time, as well as significant oversight challenges. Our objective for this report was to identify current risks to launching revenue service on schedule and reassess the company's oversight of the program.



We found that the Acela 21 program employed some sound program management practices, but program weaknesses still posed significant risks. Project delays had eliminated any cushion in the schedule, and multiple indicators pointed to further delays beyond the planned service launch in 2021.

No schedule cushion left. The company instituted some key program management practices for Acela 21, including establishing a dedicated team to oversee the trainset acquisition and developing an integrated master schedule and a list of program risks. Nevertheless, the program had no schedule cushion left, in part because of delays by Alstom—the trainset manufacturer—in delivering the trainsets, and also because of other management weaknesses. Specifically, key program officials had competing responsibilities, and the program's management structure did not clearly define the program sponsor's authority to task key program officials and make decisions to ensure problems are addressed in a timely manner.

Multiple indicators of further delays, but insufficient contingency planning. The company needed to complete five critical program elements before launching revenue service, and a delay in any one of them would delay the launch. Two of these elements had already experienced delays, including a projected delay by Alstom in delivering the first trainset. Company executives acknowledged that all five elements would have to proceed nearly flawlessly to ensure on-time revenue launch in 2021 but had developed only one contingency plan. Because the company had not developed and assessed a fuller range of contingency plans, such as selectively reducing service

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on lower-demand Acela trains, it could not make fully informed decisions about how to mitigate the impacts of delays or whether to increase resources to try to avoid some delays.

Delay in generating additional revenue. Even if new trainsets enter revenue service on time, they would not generate additional revenue as soon as the company planned. Each new trainset will have 76 more seats than the older trainset it replaces and selling tickets for these extra seats should provide additional sources of revenue. Due to the projected trainset delivery delay, however, the company concluded that, before it could sell tickets for the additional seats, it must have enough trainsets to guarantee with 99 percent confidence that a new trainset would be available for a particular timeslot in the Acela schedule to avoid potentially overbooking seats and damaging the brand. We estimated that the forgone revenue could run into the millions of dollars, and any additional delays in trainset delivery would increase this amount.

We recommended that the company ensure key program officials have sufficient capacity so that competing responsibilities did not interfere with their ability to complete program tasks in a timely manner. We also recommended that it assess the extent to which the program sponsor had the authority to task key program officials and make decisions necessary to resolve problems and to address any gaps in this authority. Finally, we recommended that it task the program management team with developing additional contingency plans and assessing their operational and financial impacts. The company agreed with our recommendations.

Better Estimates Needed of the Financial Impacts of Poor On-Time Performance

(Report No. OIG-A-2020-001, October 14, 2019)

On-time performance (OTP) of the company's trains has been a longstanding challenge for the company, which identifies poor OTP as a key factor driving its annual operating loss—about \$171 million in FY 2018.

In that year, 27 percent of the company's trains were late, with some routes performing better than others. The company's best performing routes were its state supported and Northeast Corridor lines, which arrived on time 81 percent and 78 percent of the time, respectively. Long-distance routes, however, typically performed the worst; just 46 percent of trains arrived on time, and the average delay was 49 minutes.

There is a financial correlation between trains being on time and a railroad's financial performance. A 2008 report by the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) Office of Inspector General (OIG) found that poor OTP weakens the company's financial position by reducing revenues and increasing operating costs. In February 2019, Congress directed our office to update DOT OIG's report.

Using company data on costs and ticket revenues, we identified the following short- and long-term financial benefits of improving OTP:

Short-term benefits. We estimated that improving OTP on each route by 5 percentage points—a conservative assumption based on common forecasting principles—could result in net financial short-term benefits of \$12.1 million in the first year, including \$8.2 million in reduced costs and \$3.9 million in increased revenue. These benefits would accrue immediately based on shorter train-operating times and improved customer satisfaction.

Long-term benefits. We identified a range of other financial benefits that could accrue if the company was able to improve OTP to a minimum level of 75 percent on long distance trains and sustain those improvements for at least a year. Based on company and our own analyses, we identified opportunities to realize at least \$41.9 million per year in additional cost savings and revenue improvements and an estimated \$336 million in one-time savings associated with reduced equipment replacement needs.

We also found that the company did not fully and systemically measure the impacts of poor OTP and therefore had limited data to discuss OTP's financial

consequences with stakeholders such as Congress and affected parties. We recommended that the company update its models to improve the reliability of its forecasts of the short-term financial impacts of various rates of OTP and use its models to develop more reliable estimates of the financial impacts of delays associated with various business activities. The company agreed with our recommendation.

BASED ON COMPANY AND OUR OWN ANALYSES, WE IDENTIFIED OPPORTUNITIES TO REALIZE AT LEAST \$41.9 MILLION PER YEAR IN ADDITIONAL COST SAVINGS AND REVENUE IMPROVEMENTS AND AN ESTIMATED \$336 MILLION IN ONE-TIME SAVINGS ASSOCIATED WITH REDUCED EQUIPMENT REPLACEMENT NEEDS.

Ongoing Work

Audit of Positive Train Control. Our objective will be to assess the company's efforts to implement and operate positive train control.

Audit of the Engineering Department's Management of Maintenance-of-Way Resources During Track Outages. Our objective is to assess the company's efforts to plan for and manage outages, a persistent challenge for the company, including its use of equipment and labor during these periods.

Governance

Stronger Controls Would Help Identify Fraudulent Medical Claims Sooner and Limit Losses

(Report No. OIG-A-2020-003, December 10, 2019)

Health care costs continue to rise nationwide, and the cost of medical expenses that Amtrak paid on behalf of agreement employees covered under its group health plan has increased an average of about 4.4 percent annually, or a total of about 18 percent since 2014. From calendar years 2014 through 2018, the company paid about \$275 million to 30,599 non-hospital health care facilities such as laboratories, substance abuse and behavioral treatment centers, durable medical equipment suppliers, emergency rooms, and ambulatory surgery centers. As a self-insured company, Amtrak bears the risk of any improper medical claim payments resulting from fraud. Since 2014, we have reported on numerous instances of health care fraud against the company's plan, with a total payment in excess of \$9.5 million to fraudulent providers. This report built on our prior work and assessed the effectiveness of the company's controls to mitigate the risk of fraud in its payments to non-hospital facilities.

Our assessment of the company's medical claim payments against a set of fraud indicators showed that the company continues to be exposed to potential fraud in its medical claim payments that it has not yet identified. This puts company funds at risk. Based on our analysis of billing patterns of non-hospital facilities the company reimbursed during our review period, we found 191 with patterns that may indicate fraud that the company had not flagged for further review. We estimated that this put at risk the \$57 million the company paid these facilities from 2014 through 2018. We identified a similar risk in our March 2018 report and recommended that the company systematically analyze its medical claims data for patterns of potential fraud. The company agreed with this recommendation but does not expect to have this capability in place until spring of 2021—three years after our report.

We recommended that the company review the claims paid to the 191 potentially fraudulent non-hospital

facilities we identified and seek recovery of whatever portion of the \$57 million in claims it determined were improper. We also recommended that the company assess ways to implement proactive fraud detection procedures sooner, that it implements a fraud awareness initiative, and that it gathers information on fraud schemes and emerging fraud trends and use it to monitor its medical claims payments. The company agreed with our recommendations.

Better Management of Reimbursable Projects Could Help the Company Consider Benefits and Recover its Costs

(OIG-A-2020-002, October 23, 2019)

Amtrak is a for-profit corporation that received about \$507 million in revenue in FY 2016 through FY 2018 by undertaking projects for freight and commuter railroads and state departments of transportation on a cost-reimbursable basis. These reimbursable projects range from small equipment repairs to large infrastructure upgrades. The company may complete a reimbursable project in response to an external request for services based on its expertise, or it may have a contractual obligation to conduct work on its property or right-of-way for external partners. The company typically seeks full reimbursement of its costs for this work.



Our objective was to assess the extent to which the company effectively manages reimbursable projects, including its use of controls to help it recover its costs.

We found that the company did not effectively and consistently manage the reimbursable projects we reviewed due to weaknesses in assessing project costs and benefits, managing its business relationships with key project partners, and implementing controls for successful cost recovery.

Assessing costs and benefits of potential projects.

The company did not require “business cases” that define the potential costs and benefits of reimbursable projects for decision makers before undertaking such work. As a result, for two of the three projects we reviewed, the company could not ensure that the benefits would offset the \$6.8 million in unrecovered costs it reported for FY 2016 through FY 2018.

Managing its business relationships. The company did not consistently manage its business relationships on the reimbursable projects we reviewed. For example, managers on one project used progress reports, regular communication, and other practices with the company’s partner, but managers on the other two projects did not consistently do so.

Implementing project management controls. The company did not consistently implement project management controls for the projects we reviewed, such as controls to estimate, track and bill for costs. We estimated that, as a result, on two of the projects we reviewed, the company spent an additional \$10.4 million that it will not recover.

We recommended that the company require business cases to evaluate the costs and benefits before undertaking a project, update the Engineering project management standards to specify key business partnering practices, and ensure that managers implement key project management controls to recover costs. The company agreed with our recommendations.

WE ESTIMATED THAT, AS A RESULT, ON TWO OF THE PROJECTS WE REVIEWED, THE COMPANY SPENT AN ADDITIONAL \$10.4 MILLION THAT IT WILL NOT RECOVER.

Quality Control Review of the Independent Audit of Amtrak’s Consolidated Financial Statements for Fiscal Year Ended 2019

(Report No. OIG-A-2020-006, February 3, 2020)

The company contracted with the independent certified public accounting firm of Ernst & Young LLP to audit its consolidated financial statements as of September 30, 2019, and for the year then ended, and to provide a report on internal control over financial reporting and on compliance and other matters. Because the company receives federal assistance, it must obtain an audit performed in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards.

As required by the Inspector General Act of 1978, we monitored the audit activities of Ernst & Young to help ensure audit quality and compliance with auditing standards. Our review disclosed no instances in which Ernst & Young LLP did not comply, in all material respects, with generally accepted government auditing standards.

Ongoing Work

Monitoring the Work of Amtrak’s Independent Public Accountant Conducting the FY 2019 A-133 Audit.

The objective is to determine whether the Independent Public Accountant performed the single audit in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards and the Office of Management and Budget Circular A 133.

Monitoring the Work of the Independent Public Accountant Conducting the FY 2020 Audit of Amtrak’s Consolidated Financial Statement.

Our objectives are to (1) determine whether the Independent Public Accountant performed the audit





of the company's Consolidated Financial Statements in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards and (2) monitor the company's administration and facilitation of the audit.

Monitoring the Work of Amtrak's Independent Public Accountant Conducting the FY 2020 A-133 Audit.

The objective is to determine whether the Independent Public Accountant performed the single audit in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards and the Office of Management and Budget Circular A 133.

Asset Management

More Effective Management of Vehicle Fleet Would Improve Safety and Reduce Costs

(Report No. OIG-A-2020-007, March 17, 2020)

In FY 2019, the company owned or leased 2,554 vehicles and spent about \$23 million to support operations of this vehicle fleet. These vehicles range from general purpose sedans, sport utility vehicles, and

pickup trucks to specialty vehicles such as dump trucks and utility trucks. From FY 2013 through FY 2017, our office, the company, and external consultants completed studies that found weaknesses in the company's management of its vehicle fleet resulted in safety risks, an oversized and underutilized fleet, misuse of fuel purchase cards, failure to perform timely inspections and preventive maintenance, and other concerns. This report assessed the effectiveness of the company's current efforts to better manage its vehicle fleet.

We found that the company had addressed some weaknesses in its management of its vehicle fleet, including improving safety by installing dashboard cameras in most of the Engineering department's fleet, which reduced minutes of speeding by 98 percent. The company had also taken steps to right-size the fleet by eliminating about 100 vehicles. The company had not, however, addressed other longstanding weaknesses, including mitigating critical safety risks; ensuring that it needs all the vehicles it has; and responding to misuse of fuel purchase cards, overdue maintenance, and past-due inspections. For example, from mid-October 2019 through mid-January 2020, we found that Engineering managers did not provide timely coaching as required

to the drivers that accounted for half of the 2,091 recorded violations during this period. In addition, the company could not ensure that drivers operating about 71 percent of the company's fleet had a valid license and a safe driving record because it did not periodically check driving records. For example, we reported that our office investigated a driver who operated a company vehicle although he had a conviction for driving under the influence and a suspended license.

Further, we found that the company did not have comprehensive criteria for justifying initial requests for vehicles and re-justifying their continued use. As a result, we estimated that the company still had approximately 29 percent more general-purpose vehicles than it needed, and that the company was spending about \$872,000 each year to lease these vehicles. We also identified \$91,000 in one-time costs that could have been avoided with stronger controls against fuel card misuse and delayed preventive maintenance.

In order to promote safer and more efficient vehicle management, we recommended that the company take several actions, including requiring more timely coaching of drivers with safety violations, periodically checking drivers' license status and driving histories, and requiring the use of more comprehensive criteria to justify obtaining new vehicles and keeping existing ones. We also recommended that the company address fuel purchase misuse as well as delayed maintenance and missing safety inspections. The company agreed with our recommendations.

Ongoing Work

Audit of the Company's Management of the Moynihan Train Hall Program. Our objectives are to assess the effectiveness of the company's management and oversight for the Moynihan program as well as the extent to which it has identified and mitigated schedule and budget risks.

Acquisition and Procurement

Ongoing Work

Audit of Procurement and Vendor Payment Practices. Our objective is to assess the extent to which the company has improved its practices to procure goods more economically and pay vendors more efficiently.

Information Technology

Ongoing Work

Audit of Mobile Security. Our objective is to determine the extent to which the company's mobile devices and data are secure.



OFFICE OF INVESTIGATIONS

Ticket Fraud

Amtrak eVoucher Scheme

February 2020

Adam Micek, a resident of Queens, New York, pleaded guilty in U.S. District Court, Eastern District of New York, on February 20, 2020, to conspiracy to commit wire fraud for his involvement in an Amtrak eVoucher scheme. Micek and his co-conspirators used stolen credit card information to make unauthorized purchases of Amtrak tickets and then cancelled or exchanged those tickets for eVouchers. Subsequently, they sold the fraudulently obtained eVouchers on the internet.

Amtrak Ticket Scheme

December 2019

Ryan Taylor Minter, of Calumet City, Illinois, pleaded guilty in U.S. District Court, Central District of Illinois, to charges of wire fraud on December 20, 2019.

Our investigation found that Minter participated in a scheme to defraud Amtrak and others by using stolen credit card information from at least 216 different credit or debit cards to purchase Amtrak tickets online valued at over \$29,000. Minter used Amtrak's mobile application and website to purchase the tickets and then advertised them at a discounted price on social media sites frequented by college students. As part of the plea agreement, Minter has agreed to pay restitution if ordered by the court.

Minter was previously indicted on five counts of wire fraud and was arrested on July 1, 2019.

Amtrak eVoucher Scheme

October 2019

Andre Wilburn, a resident of New York, pleaded guilty in U.S. District Court, Eastern District of New York, on October 24, 2019, to access device fraud and aggravated identity theft for his involvement in an Amtrak eVoucher scheme. Wilburn and his co-conspirators used stolen credit card information to make unauthorized purchases



of Amtrak tickets and then cancelled or exchanged those tickets for eVouchers. Subsequently, they sold the fraudulently obtained eVouchers on the internet.

Amtrak eVoucher Scheme

October 2019

Lamont Brown, a resident of Brooklyn, New York, pleaded guilty in U.S. District Court, Eastern District of New York, on October 10, 2019, to conspiracy to commit wire fraud for his involvement in an Amtrak eVoucher scheme. Brown and his co-conspirators used stolen credit card information to make unauthorized purchases of Amtrak tickets and then cancelled or exchanged those tickets for eVouchers. Subsequently, they sold the fraudulently obtained eVouchers on the internet.

Health Care Fraud

Health Care Fraud

February 2020

An acupuncturist was sentenced to two-and-a-half years in federal prison February 4, 2020, and was ordered to pay more than \$2.68 million in restitution to Amtrak after defrauding the railroad's health care plan for approximately \$3.8 million in acupuncture treatments

and other services that were either medically unnecessary or never provided.

Amtrak OIG investigators previously found that Guiqiong Xiao Gudmundsen, 53, aka “Kimi” Gudmundsen, the owner of Healthy Life Acupuncture Center, deliberately targeted Amtrak employees in a “multifaceted and pervasive” fraud scheme, according to court documents. In total, Gudmundsen billed Amtrak’s health care plan for more than \$7.1 million, about \$3.8 million of which was deemed fraudulent, according to government estimates in the plea agreement.

AN ACUPUNCTURIST WAS SENTENCED TO TWO-AND-A-HALF YEARS IN FEDERAL PRISON FEBRUARY 4, 2020, AND WAS ORDERED TO PAY MORE THAN \$2.68 MILLION IN RESTITUTION TO AMTRAK AFTER DEFRAUDING THE RAILROAD’S HEALTH CARE PLAN FOR APPROXIMATELY \$3.8 MILLION IN ACUPUNCTURE TREATMENTS AND OTHER SERVICES THAT WERE EITHER MEDICALLY UNNECESSARY OR NEVER PROVIDED.

During a nearly seven-year period from January 2008 to December 2015, Gudmundsen recruited Amtrak employees to visit her acupuncture facilities in Riverside, California, and Los Angeles. She repeatedly billed Amtrak’s health care plan for services that were not performed or provided to people not covered under Amtrak’s plan, services like massages and facials that were medically unnecessary, double-billed to other insurance plans, or falsely billed in ways that would result in higher reimbursement rates.

Gudmundsen’s bills to Amtrak’s health care plan were so frequent and costly that, at the peak of her fraud scheme, she was ranked 32nd among all health care providers that billed the plan. In fact, according to billing

data, Gudmundsen charged more to Amtrak’s plan than Mount Sinai Medical Center in Chicago (number 33) and Johns Hopkins Hospital in Baltimore (number 39).

In addition to Amtrak OIG, the Gudmundsen case was investigated by Internal Revenue Service Criminal Investigation, and the U.S. Department of Labor, Employee Benefits Security Administration. The case was prosecuted by the U.S. Attorney’s Office, Central District of California.

Fraudulent Billing Scheme

October 2019

The former CEO of a Missouri hospital pleaded guilty Oct. 29, 2019, for his role in perpetrating a pass-through billing scheme in which the hospital was used to submit fraudulent claims for toxicology and blood testing, resulting in approximately \$114 million in payments from insurance companies and Missouri Medicaid.

David Lane Byrns, 62, of Lighthouse Point, Florida, the former CEO of Putnam County Memorial Hospital in Missouri, pleaded guilty to a one-count information charging him with conspiracy to commit health care fraud. The case was transferred from the Western District of Missouri to the Middle District of Florida by consent for the entry of Byrns’ plea. Byrns agreed to a forfeiture judgment of \$5.1 million.

According to his guilty plea, Byrns and others, including a laboratory owner, arranged for urine and blood drug tests to be performed on a massive scale at diagnostic testing laboratories outside Missouri for individuals who were not Putnam patients and who had no connection to the hospital. Many of the tests conducted were medically unnecessary, and most of the tests did not take place at Putnam. Putnam, however, served as a pass through, fraudulently billing insurance companies and Missouri Medicaid for the tests as if they had been performed at the hospital.

Putnam billed Amtrak’s health plans more than \$52,000. Byrns is the second CEO/company owner to plead guilty in this case. Amtrak’s health care plans

have been billed in excess of \$900,000 through similar schemes perpetrated at rural hospitals and related labs.

Agents from Amtrak OIG, along with the FBI's Jacksonville Field Office; the Jefferson City, Missouri, Resident Agency of the FBI's Kansas City Field Office; the U.S. Office of Personnel Management OIG; and the U.S. Department of Labor OIG investigated the case.

Health Care Fraud

October 2019

Joshua Pearson, a marketer from St. George, Utah, pleaded guilty on October 22, 2019, in U.S. District Court, Central District of California, to receipt of illegal kickbacks related to a health care fraud scheme. As part of the scheme, Pearson received kickbacks from Sheridan Medical for patient referrals for compounded drugs—drugs that were medically unnecessary. A marketer from Sheridan Medical and the owner of Fusion Rx Compounding Pharmacy, both in Los Angeles, were also charged for their role in the scheme. The Amtrak health insurance plan was fraudulently billed \$17,000 as a result of the scheme. Criminal judicial proceedings for all three defendants are pending.

Contract Fraud

Disadvantage Business Enterprise Scheme

November 2019

Alpha Painting & Construction Company, Inc., an industrial painting and construction company based in Baltimore, was sentenced November 14, 2019, in United States District Court, Eastern District of Pennsylvania, to five-years' probation, a \$500,000 fine, and forfeiture of \$10.9 million. Alpha was previously found guilty of conspiracy, wire fraud, and false statements related to a multimillion-dollar fraud scheme.

The scheme involved two Pennsylvania Department of Transportation contracts to rehabilitate bridges in the Philadelphia area including the 30th Street

Station Bridge and Girard Point Bridge. The terms of the contracts required Alpha to use a qualified Disadvantaged Business Enterprise to provide supplies for the projects. Instead, Alpha used a now defunct DBE as a pass-through to create the appearance that DBE program requirements had been met. In exchange for participating in the scheme, the DBE received a percentage of funds garnered from falsified invoices it submitted, according to court documents. In addition, Alpha falsified invoices from out-of-state projects including an Amtrak bridge project to use as DBE credits.

A former project manager for Alpha, Stamatios "Tom" Kousisis, 62, of Downingtown, Delaware, was also sentenced for his role in concocting the scheme to obtain and keep the two bridge contracts. Kousisis was sentenced November 6, 2019, to 70 months' imprisonment, three years' supervised release, and a \$17,500 fine for wire fraud and related charges resulting from the scheme.

Agents from Amtrak OIG, along with the U.S. DOT OIG, the U.S. Department of Labor OIG, and the FBI investigated the case.

A FORMER PROJECT MANAGER FOR ALPHA, STAMATIOS "TOM" KOUSISIS, 62, OF DOWNINGTOWN, DELAWARE, WAS ALSO SENTENCED FOR HIS ROLE IN CONCOCTING THE SCHEME TO OBTAIN AND KEEP THE TWO BRIDGE CONTRACTS. KOUSISIS WAS SENTENCED NOVEMBER 6, 2019, TO 70 MONTHS' IMPRISONMENT, THREE YEARS' SUPERVISED RELEASE, AND A \$17,500 FINE FOR WIRE FRAUD AND RELATED CHARGES RESULTING FROM THE SCHEME.

Falsified Drug Testing

Falsified Preemployment Drug Test

November 2019

Michael Hollingsworth, a resident of New York, pleaded guilty in U.S. District Court, Southern District of New York, on November 19, 2019, for accepting a gratuity in return for his involvement in falsifying an Amtrak pre-employment drug test. According to the indictment, Hollingsworth worked as a drug test sample collector. He received cash from an Amtrak job applicant to submit a fraudulent sample to ensure the applicant passed Amtrak's drug screening requirement. Hollingsworth will be sentenced at a later date.

Employee Misconduct

Grand Theft

March 2020

A former Los Angeles-based Amtrak employee was sentenced in Los Angeles Municipal Court on March 13, 2020, to three years of probation, ordered to pay \$34,030 in restitution to Amtrak, and to complete 90 days of community service. The former employee pleaded guilty to grand theft after our investigation revealed she stole money from the Employee Vending Commission Fund. She admitted to a portion of her total theft on December 4, 2018, during an interview with our agents and immediately resigned from the company thereafter.

Improper Leave Use

March 2020

A Customer Service Representative in Joliet, Illinois, was terminated from employment on March 16, 2020, following an administrative hearing for violating company policy. Our investigation found that the employee inappropriately used leave granted under the Family Medical Leave Act to engage in outside

employment. Additionally, the employee was dishonest with our agents when we interviewed him during the investigation.

Improper Use of Company Time, Resources

March 2020

A Computer Tech based in Bear, Delaware, violated Amtrak policies by conducting consultation work for a travel agency while using company equipment and resources on company time. Although the employee was instructed and counseled by her supervisors to discontinue doing so, we found occasions where she continued unauthorized activity after being counseled. On March 16, 2020, the employee retired in lieu of disciplinary action.

Unentitled Payments

February 2020

Twenty-one Amtrak machinists and supervisors were coached and counseled between October 31, 2019, and February 16, 2020, after our investigation determined the employees received temporary pay increases they were not entitled to. Known as "pay differentials," these temporary hourly pay increases are granted for work performed beyond an employee's regular duties. We found that employees based in Chicago, Los Angeles, and Washington were ineligible to receive the pay differentials, yet they requested these payments from the company's Work Management System and their supervisors approved them without proper verification. We found that the company paid approximately \$43,000 in pay differentials that it was not contractually obligated to pay under its collective bargaining agreement. Company officials said they implemented an updated pay differential policy that will prevent future overpayments.

Failure to Report Conviction

January 2020

An Amtrak Passenger Conductor in Los Angeles, California, was terminated from employment on January 23, 2020, following the employee's administrative hearing

for violating company policy. Our investigation found that the employee was convicted for driving under the influence in July 2015 and failed to report the conviction to the company, as required by company policy.

Solicitation of Money, Acceptance of Gifts

January 2020

An Amtrak senior employee in Los Angeles, California, was terminated from employment on January 21, 2020, and a Los Angeles-based senior employee in Mechanical Operations was issued a written reprimand on the same date following the issuance of our investigative report. Our investigation found that the senior employee solicited money and accepted gifts from company contractors. Our investigation also found that the senior employee in Mechanical Operations misused company equipment and email when proposing a personal business venture with a company contractor.

OUR INVESTIGATION FOUND THAT THE EMPLOYEE WAS CONVICTED FOR DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE IN JULY 2015 AND FAILED TO REPORT THE CONVICTION TO THE COMPANY, AS REQUIRED BY COMPANY POLICY.

Medical Fraud

January 2020

Three Chicago-based employees were terminated from employment on December 20 and December 23, 2019, and two more resigned on December 18, 2019, and January 2, 2020, in lieu of termination prior to their administrative hearings. The five former employees participated in a medical fraud scheme in violation of company policies.

Our investigation found that the former employees provided a chiropractor, based in Dolton, Illinois, with

OUR INVESTIGATION FOUND THAT THE FORMER EMPLOYEES PROVIDED A CHIROPRACTOR, BASED IN DOLTON, ILLINOIS, WITH THEIR MEDICAL AND PERSONALLY IDENTIFIABLE INFORMATION, TYPICALLY THEIR NAMES AND DATES OF BIRTH OR THOSE OF THEIR DEPENDENTS, IN EXCHANGE FOR CASH KICKBACKS.

their medical and personally identifiable information, typically their names and dates of birth or those of their dependents, in exchange for cash kickbacks. The chiropractor used the information to fraudulently bill Amtrak's health insurance plan for services that were not provided. In addition, all five employees lied to our agents during their interviews.

Falsified Medical Documents

December 2019

A Reservation Sales Agent based in Philadelphia was terminated from employment on December 23, 2019, for submitting falsified medical documentation to extend her medical leave of absence. She had previously entered into an Alternative Resolution Dispute Agreement on November 4, 2019, with the Magisterial District in Bucks County, Pennsylvania, and received 12 months of probation, 10 hours of community service, and was directed to pay restitution of \$228 to Amtrak.

Health Care Fraud

December 2019

Gladys Perez, a Los Angeles-based Coach Cleaner, was terminated from employment on December 5, 2019, following an administrative hearing for violating company policy. Our investigation found that Perez participated in a health care fraud scheme in which Amtrak's health care plan was billed for acupuncture and other services that were not actually provided. On October 10, 2019, Perez signed a pretrial diversion letter agreement, which was accepted in U.S. District Court, Central District of

California, wherein she admitted to committing two counts of health care fraud in furtherance of the scheme to defraud Amtrak's health plan.

Employee Abuse, Property Theft

November 2019

An Amtrak supervisor resigned on November 14, 2019, for violating company policy by stealing company property and misusing his own and other employees' company time for personal tasks. The case has been referred to the U.S. Department of Justice, and criminal proceedings are pending.

False Documentation, Statements

November 2019

An Amtrak Assistant Conductor in Pontiac, Michigan, was terminated from employment on November 12, 2019, following an administrative hearing for violating company policy. Our investigation found that the employee submitted false documentation and made false and misleading statements regarding his claim that he sustained a work-related injury. Additionally, the employee was not truthful when we interviewed him during the investigation.

Travel Pass Fraud

October 2019

A former Amtrak Program Manager based in Washington, D.C., and her sister entered into a Community Service Deferred Sentencing Agreement in Superior Court, District of Columbia, on October 28, 2019. As part of the agreement, they agreed to each pay \$2,128 in restitution to Amtrak, complete 48 hours of community service, write a letter of apology to Amtrak, and not violate any laws for six months in order to avoid sentencing for their crime. The employee was terminated on July 1, 2019, for fraudulently allowing a family member to use her company travel pass and Amtrak identification card to frequently travel on Amtrak trains between May 2018 and June 2019.

AN AMTRAK SUPERVISOR RESIGNED ON NOVEMBER 14, 2019, FOR VIOLATING COMPANY POLICY BY STEALING COMPANY PROPERTY AND MISUSING HIS OWN AND OTHER EMPLOYEES' COMPANY TIME FOR PERSONAL TASKS.

Fraud Scheme for Fake Charter Trip

October 2019

An Amtrak On Board Services employee in New Orleans was terminated from employment on October 9, 2019, following an administrative hearing for violating company policy. Our investigation found that the employee fraudulently advertised and accepted payment for an Amtrak private charter trip that Amtrak officials neither authorized nor scheduled. The employee accepted \$400-\$500 for reservations from at least 35 members of the public for this non-existent trip. As part of the scheme, the employee used the Amtrak logo, company email, and photographs in communications with the victims. Judicial proceedings are pending.

Outside Employment

October 2019

A former Road Mechanic based in Providence, Rhode Island, resigned from employment in March 2019 during the course of our investigation which revealed the employee violated company policies by leaving his work site to engage in outside employment as a tow truck operator during his Amtrak work shifts from July 2017 until December 2018. Although the employee resigned, he continued to seek re-employment with Amtrak. On October 6, 2019, Amtrak designated him as ineligible for rehire.



APPENDIX A: STATISTICAL DATA

TABLE A.1. FINANCIAL IMPACT

MONETARY BENEFIT TYPE	AMOUNT THIS PERIOD
Better Use of Funds	\$13,107,000
Questioned Costs	\$57,000,000
Recoveries and Restitution	\$23,465,355.06 ^a
Forfeitures	\$17,548,594.54
Cost Avoidance	\$1,622,392.65

^a This includes approximately \$20.2 million in restitution to numerous health care providers impacted by fraud identified in a health care fraud investigation we supported as part of the FBI-led Greater Palm Beach Health Care Fraud Task Force. Of that amount, Amtrak's health care provider paid more than \$2,900 for insurance claims related to the case.

TABLE A.2. AUDIT ACTIVITY DURING THE PERIOD

REPORT INFORMATION	BETTER USE OF FUNDS	QUESTIONED COSTS
Better Estimates Needed of the Financial Impacts of Poor On-Time Performance <i>Issued 10/14/2019 Report OIG-A-2020-001</i>	—	—
Better Management of Reimbursable Projects Could Help the Company Consider Benefits and Recover its Costs <i>Issued 10/23/2019 Report OIG-A-2020-002</i>	\$10,400,000	—
Stronger Controls Would Help Identify Fraudulent Medical Claims Sooner and Limit Losses <i>Issued 12/10/2019 Report OIG-A-2020-003</i>	—	\$57,000,000
Acela 21 Program Continues to Face Significant Risk of Delays, Warranting More Contingency Planning <i>Issued 1/21/2020 Report OIG-A-2020-004</i>	—	—
Addressing Security Weaknesses and Operational Impacts of Amtrak Express is Critical to the Program's Future <i>Issued 1/22/2020 Report OIG-A-2020-005</i>	—	—
Quality Control Review of the Independent Audit of Amtrak's Consolidated Financial Statements for Fiscal Year Ended 2019 <i>Issued 2/3/2020 Report OIG-A-2020-006</i>	—	—
More Effective Management of Vehicle Fleet Would Improve Safety and Reduce Costs <i>Issued 3/17/2020 Report OIG-A-2020-007</i>	\$2,707,000	—
Total Monetary Impact	\$13,107,000	\$57,000,000

TABLE A.3. ONGOING AUDITS

ONGOING PROJECT STATUS	NUMBER OF PROJECTS
Audit Projects In-process, as of 9/30/2019	10
Audit Projects Canceled	—
Canceled Audit Projects Not Disclosed to the Public	—
Audit Projects Started Since 9/30/2019	7
Audit Products Issued Since 9/30/2019	7
Audit Projects In-process, as of 3/31/2020	10

TABLE A.4. ADVISORY FUNCTIONS DURING THE PERIOD

ACTIVITY	ACTIONS
Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) Requests Received	7
FOIA Requests Processed	6
FOIA Requests Referred to Amtrak	1
FOIA Requests with Responses Pending	2
FOIA Appeals Received	—
FOIA Appeals Processed	—
Legislation Reviewed	2
Regulations Reviewed	5
Outside Agency Consultation	1

TABLE A.5. INVESTIGATIVE ACTIVITY DURING THE PERIOD

INVESTIGATIVE CASELOAD	NUMBER
Investigations Opened	40
Investigations Closed	34
Closed Investigations of Senior Employees Not Publicly Disclosed	—

CASES OPENED	NUMBER
Major Misconduct and General Crimes	29
Health Care Fraud	9
Contract and Procurement Fraud	2
Federal Employers' Liability Act and Other Claims Fraud	—

HOTLINE ACTIVITY	NUMBER
Referred to Amtrak Management	101
Referred to Customer Service	87
Referred to Amtrak Police Department	4
Referred for Audit	1
Referred for Investigation	19
Referred to Other Agency	—
Request from Other Agency	1
No Action Warranted	46

JUDICIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE ACTIONS	NUMBER
Criminal Referrals to Department of Justice	26
Criminal Referrals to State and Local Prosecuting Authorities	10
Criminal Referrals Declined	17
Arrests	10
Indictments/Informations	15 ^a
Convictions	14
Investigative Reports Issued to the company	17
Administrative Actions	37

^a Indictments/Informations include all indictments, informations, and complaints sealed and unsealed, of individuals who were charged during this reporting period by federal, state, and local prosecutors. Of the 15 indictments/informations/complaints reported, one was referred for prosecution this reporting period and 14 were referred for prosecution in a prior reporting period.

TABLE A.6. REPORTS DESCRIBED IN PREVIOUS SEMIANNUAL REPORTS FOR WHICH CORRECTIVE ACTIONS ARE NOT COMPLETE^{a,b}

REPORT INFORMATION	BETTER USE OF FUNDS	QUESTIONED COSTS
Leadership Needed to Help Ensure That Stations Served by Amtrak Are Compliant <i>Issued 9/29/2011 Report 109-2010</i>	—	—
Master Services Agreements Are Not Strategically Managed, and Award and Oversight Processes Can Be Improved <i>Issued 2/22/2017 Report OIG-A-2017-006</i>	—	—
Better Adherence to Leading Practices for Ethics Programs Could Reduce Company Risks <i>Issued 6/26/2017 Report OIG-A-2017-012</i>	—	—
Background Checks Process Has Improved, but Some Inefficiencies and Gaps Persist <i>Issued 11/1/2018 Report OIG-A-2019-001</i>	—	—
Weaknesses in Contract Oversight Pose Financial, Operational, and Legal Risks <i>Issued 3/4/2019 Report OIG-A-2019-004</i>	—	—
Improving Management Processes Could Reduce Costs and Generate Additional Revenues <i>Issued 3/29/2019 Report OIG-A-2019-006</i>	\$17,600,000	—
Improving Cybersecurity and Resiliency of Train Control Systems Could Reduce Vulnerabilities <i>Issued 7/9/2019 Report OIG-A-2019-008</i>	—	—
Improved Inventory Practices Could Help the Company Better Manage its Maintenance-of-Way and Rolling Stock Equipment <i>Issued 7/25/2019 Report OIG-A-2019-010</i>	—	—
Rightsizing Workforce and Using It More Flexibly Could Reduce Costs at Preventative Maintenance Facilities <i>Issued 9/3/2019 Report OIG-A-2019-012</i>	\$6,300,000 ^c	—
Improving Controls Over the Use of Procurement Cards Could Better Ensure Compliance and Limit Potential Misuse <i>Issued 9/30/2019 Report OIG-A-2019-013</i>	—	—
Total Monetary Impact	\$23,900,000	

^a We received comments for all audit reports within 60 days.

^b Please visit <https://www.amtrakoig.gov/reports/audits> for a copy of the reports listed in this table.

^c \$2.1 million annually projected over three years.

TABLE A.7. RESOLUTION STATUS OF AUDITS WITH QUESTIONED COSTS

RESOLUTION STATUS	NUMBER	DOLLAR VALUE
Reports with No Management Decision Made by the Commencement of the Reporting Period	—	\$—
Reports Issued During the Reporting Period	1	\$57,000,000
MANAGEMENT DECISIONS DURING THE PERIOD		
Amounts Agreed to by Management	1	\$57,000,000
Amounts Not Agreed to by management	—	—
NO MANAGEMENT DECISION AT END OF PERIOD		
Reports Carried Over to Next Reporting Period	—	—

TABLE A.8. RESOLUTION STATUS OF AUDITS WITH RECOMMENDED FUNDS TO BE PUT TO BETTER USE BY MANAGEMENT

RESOLUTION STATUS	NUMBER	DOLLAR VALUE
Reports with No Management Decision Made by the Commencement of the Reporting Period	—	\$—
Reports Issued During the Reporting Period	2	\$13,107,000
MANAGEMENT DECISIONS DURING THE PERIOD		
Amounts Agreed to by Management	2	\$13,107,000
Amounts Not Agreed to by Management	—	—
NO MANAGEMENT DECISION AT END OF PERIOD		
Reports Carried Over to Next Reporting Period	—	—

APPENDIX B: REVIEW OF LEGISLATION, REGULATIONS, AND MAJOR POLICIES

Section 4(a)(2) of the Inspector General Act of 1978, as amended, provides that the Inspector General shall review existing and proposed legislation and regulations relating to programs and operations of such establishment. Also, the Inspector General shall make recommendations in the semiannual reports concerning the impact of such legislation or regulations on the economy and efficiency in the administration of such programs and operations administered or financed by such establishment—or the prevention and detection of fraud and abuse in such programs and operations.

During the last reporting period, the OIG reviewed and provided comments on five Amtrak corporate policies and continued its efforts to ensure the American taxpayers' dollars entrusted to Amtrak were protected by working with the U.S. Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation on a proposed legislative initiative.

This initiative would require the U.S. DOT to review 49 C.F.R. §§ 240, 242 to determine whether locomotive engineers and conductors should be required to report all drug or alcohol-related arrests or offenses immediately to Amtrak Human Resources.

Currently, Amtrak employees, such as coach cleaners and on-board service personnel, must report any drug or alcohol-related arrest or conviction to Amtrak Human Resources. For those who physically operate the trains, however, the rules are not as restrictive. Specifically, for locomotive engineers and conductors, Amtrak's policy reflects the C.F.R. rules that simply require conductors and engineers to report any conviction of, or completed state action to cancel, revoke, suspend, or deny a motor vehicle driver's license for, operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of or impaired by alcohol or a controlled substance to Amtrak. The policy also requires engineers and conductors to report any type of temporary or permanent denial to hold a motor vehicle driver's license when found to have either refused an alcohol or drug test, or to be under the influence or impaired when operating a motor vehicle. No requirement exists,


however, for these safety-sensitive personnel to report an alcohol-related arrest, such as public intoxication, as is required for other Amtrak employees.

Under the proposed legislative initiative, if the DOT believes that the C.F.R. should be updated, it would be required to notify the Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee and the House Transportation and Infrastructure Committee on its determination and publish a notice in the Federal Register within 18 months of a proposed revision.

If this legislation becomes law, and DOT makes a determination to require notification of all drug or alcohol-related arrests or offenses, Amtrak will be able to refer those employees to the Employee Assistance Program for an evaluation to determine whether the employee has a substance abuse issue. This will allow Amtrak to assess the risk that employees may pose to themselves and to the traveling public.

While this matter remains in the legislative process, we believe this legislative initiative would further safeguard Amtrak's federal funding from fraud, waste, and abuse, while also ensuring the safety and security of its passengers and employees.

APPENDIX C: OIG ORGANIZATION



The OIG headquarters is based in Washington, D.C., with field offices in Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, and Philadelphia.

The Inspector General provides policy direction and leadership for the OIG and serves as an independent and objective voice to management, the Board of Directors, and Congress by identifying opportunities

and promoting solutions for improving the company's programs and operations, while preventing and detecting fraud, waste, and abuse.

The Deputy Inspector General serves in the stead of the Inspector General, as required, and leads the operational and support staffs within the OIG.

Counsel to the Inspector General. This office provides legal assistance and advice to OIG senior management and supports audits, investigations, and special reviews. The Office of Counsel also coordinates OIG legal matters with external entities, such as the Department of Justice, and federal and state law enforcement.

Audits. This office conducts independent and objective audits across the spectrum of the company's programs and operational activities. It produces reports aimed at improving the company's economy, efficiency, and effectiveness, while seeking to detect and prevent fraud, waste, and abuse.

Investigations. This office pursues allegations of fraud, waste, abuse, and misconduct that could affect the company's programs, operations, assets, and other resources. It refers investigative findings to the Department of Justice for criminal prosecution or civil litigation, or to management for administrative action. It also develops recommendations to reduce vulnerability to abuse and criminal activity.

Mission Support. This office provides budget and financial management; contracting and procurement; information technology; general administrative support and human capital, which ensures that the best qualified people are hired, developed, retained, and rewarded appropriately in accordance with applicable laws, regulations, and OIG policy. It also ensures that an effective and efficient performance management system is implemented to provide employees with timely and meaningful feedback and coaching on performance.

APPENDIX D: PEER REVIEW RESULTS

The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (P. L. 111–203, July 21, 2010) requires that OIGs include in semiannual reports to Congress the results of any peer review conducted by another OIG during the reporting period, or—if no peer review was conducted—a statement identifying the date of the last peer review. Also required is a list of all peer reviews conducted during the period by the OIG of another OIG, and the status of any recommendations made to or by the OIG.

During fiscal year 2019, our Office of Audits was the subject of a Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE) peer review by the Tennessee Valley Authority OIG. The Tennessee Valley Authority OIG determined that the system of quality control for our audit function has been suitably designed and complied with to provide reasonable assurance of performing and reporting in conformity with applicable professional standards in all material respects.

Accordingly, the Tennessee Valley Authority OIG provided a “pass” rating and made no recommendations. The report was released on April 15, 2019.

Also during fiscal year 2019, our Office of Investigations was the subject of a CIGIE peer review by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) OIG. The FDIC OIG concluded that the system of internal safeguards and management procedures for our investigative function was in compliance with the quality standards established by CIGIE and the Attorney General’s Guidelines for Offices of Inspector General with Statutory Law Enforcement Authority. The FDIC OIG identified a number of best practices in our investigative operations that they believed warranted acknowledgement.

Our office did not complete any peer reviews of any other OIG during the reporting period.

APPENDIX E: ABBREVIATIONS

CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CIGIE	Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and Efficiency
DOT	Department of Transportation
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FDIC	Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
FY	Fiscal Year
OIG	Office of Inspector General
OTP	On-Time Performance

APPENDIX F: REPORTING REQUIREMENTS

INSPECTOR GENERAL ACT CITATION	REPORTING REQUIREMENT	PAGE
4(a)(2)	Review of Legislation and Regulations	25
5(a)(1)	Significant Problems, Abuses, and Deficiencies	3-18
5(a)(2)	Recommendations for Corrective Action to Significant Problems	3-18
5(a)(3)	Audit Reports Described in Previous Semiannual Reports for Which Corrective Actions are Not Complete	23
5(a)(4)	Matters Referred to Prosecutive Authorities	22
5(a)(5)	Information Assistance Refused or Not Provided	N/A
5(a)(6)	Audit Reports Issued in This Reporting Period	20
5(a)(7)	Summary of Significant Reports	3-18
5(a)(8)	Audit Reports with Questioned Costs	24
5(a)(9)	Audit Reports with Recommendations That Funds Be Put to Better Use	24
5(a)(10)	Previous Audit Reports Issued with No Management Decision Made by End of This Reporting Period	24
5(a)(11)	Significant Revised Management Decisions	N/A
5(a)(12)	Significant Management Decisions with Which the OIG is in Disagreement	N/A
5(a)(13)	Federal Financial Management Improvement Act-Related Reporting	N/A
5(a)(14–16)	Peer Review Results	27
5(a)(17-18)	Investigative Reporting Statistical Tables	22
5(a)(19)	Investigations on Senior Government Employees Where Allegations are Substantiated	13-18
5(a)(20)	Instances of Whistleblower Retaliation	N/A
5(a)(21)	Instances of Interference with Independence or Restrictions on Access	N/A
5(a,b)(22)	Instances of Inspections, Evaluations, Audits, and Investigations Not Disclosed to the Public	21-22

MISSION

The Amtrak OIG's mission is to provide independent, objective oversight of Amtrak's programs and operations through audits and investigations focused on recommending improvements to Amtrak's economy, efficiency, and effectiveness; preventing and detecting fraud, waste, and abuse; and providing Congress, Amtrak management and Amtrak's Board of Directors with timely information about problems and deficiencies relating to Amtrak's programs and operations.

OBTAINING COPIES OF REPORTS AND TESTIMONY

Available at our website www.amtrakoig.gov

REPORTING FRAUD, WASTE, AND ABUSE

Report suspicious or illegal activities to the OIG Hotline www.amtrakoig.gov/hotline or **800-468-5469**

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